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Abstract—Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is
an emerging manufacturing technology that is expected to have
far-reaching socioeconomic, environmental, and geopolitical im-
plications. As the use of this technology increases, the need for
validation of 3D designs grows. In order to create a marketplace
in which 3D designs are traded, it is necessary to develop a
platform that enables the attestation of the 3D designs and
promotes truthfulness. In this paper, we introduce a novel concept
of a distributed marketplace that will support the attestation of
3D printing designs. We build a mathematical trust model that
ensures truthfulness among rational, selfish, and independent
agents, which is based on a reward/penalty system. The payment
for participating in the evaluation is calculated by factoring in
agents’ reputation and peer feedback. Moreover, we describe
the architecture and the implementation of the trust model on
blockchain using smart contracts for the creation of a distributed
marketplace. Our model relies both on theoretical and practical
best practices to create an unique platform that elicit effort and
truthfulness from the participants.
Index Terms—Additive Manufacturing, Blockchain, 3D Print-
ing, Truthfulness, Distributed Market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Additive manufacturing (AM), which is often referred to
as 3D printing, is a manufacturing technology that creates
objects by incrementally fusing layers of material together.
This manufacturing technology can be applied to polymers,
metals, alloys, and composites. AM has numerous technologi-
cal, environmental, and socioeconomic advantages, such as the
ability to manufacture objects with complex internal structures,
shorter design-to-production time, just-in-time and on-demand
production, and reduced raw material waste. These advantages
encourage the use of AM to manufacture functional parts and
prototypes for medical implants [1], for military usages like
the recent 3D-printed grenade launcher [2], and many critical
cyber-physical systems. An example from the aviation field is
the FAA-approved fuel nozzle for General Electric’s LEAP jet
engine [3].
AM’s dependence on computerized systems has raised con-
cerns in the security community regarding possible scenarios
of IP theft and sabotage attacks [4]. The recent ”dr0wned”
study [5] demonstrated a full chain of attack applied on AM
and discussed the ways a manipulation can be inserted into
the AM process. The authors sabotaged a 3D printed rotor
of a quadcopter UAV, causing the rotor to break mid-flight
and the quadcopter to fall after a short operating time. This,
and other scenarios that have been discussed in the literature,
can be carried out through manipulation of the design files
(e.g Figure 1 that contains a propeller with a design flaw
that cannot be easily detected). As the AM field grows, the
need for validated design files increases. Currently, the design
files for 3D printing are open-source and located in various
publicly available repositories across the Web, where anyone
can upload a design. However, in order to create an ecosystem
around the AM technology, there is a need for a marketplace of
3D design files that have been validated and deemed secure.
Since evaluation of 3D design files require resources and it
is hard to measure the amount of effort that was invested
in the attestation, there is a need for a set of rules that will
elicit the required effort. However, even if effort was invested,
the participant might still choose a strategy of not reporting
the truth. Thus, we need to develop a system that encourages
truthfulness and penalizes falsehood.
In this paper, we present a framework that facilitates a
distributed marketplace for the validation and trade of 3D
design files. We present a model that enables users to test
new designs and receive compensation for their efforts. Once
the designs are validated, they can be sold in the proposed
marketplace. We build a mathematical model to create a
platform that encourages truthfulness and is based on a re-
ward/penalty system that takes reputation and peer feedback
into account. The effectiveness of this distributed market-
place depends heavily on the implementation of this trust
model. Therefore, the platform is implemented on top of the
blockchain technology and guarantees complete transparency,
ensuring that any design file that is evaluated is coupled with
the voting history of all of the users, and the calculated result
is publicly verifiable by anyone.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We present a unique, distributed marketplace that allows
3D printing designers to distribute and sell their designs.
Each 3D design is verified by the community and as-
signed with an integrity score;
• The proposed framework is based on a novel re-
ward/penalty system that takes into account reputation
and peer feedback;
• The proposed reward/penalty-based system is generic and
can support other use cases such as a marketplace for
open source code distribution and bug reporting system.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After
discussing related work in section II, we present the threat
model and motivation in section III, and list the preliminaries
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Figure 1: Faulty 3D design file
in section IV. Sections V and VI describe the trust model and
blockchain implementation of the flow for validating a design
file, respectively. In section VII we discuss the model, possible
real-world fraud scenarios and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
By the end of 2017, approximately 70 publications ad-
dressed the threats of AM security. A survey by Yampolskiy
et al. [4] discussed the ways in which the 3D design files can
be manipulated.
In the dr0wned study [5] researchers presented a full chain
of attack with AM that caused material fatigue of a functional
part by manipulating the 3D design files. The authors sabo-
taged the 3D printed rotor of a quadcopter UAV, causing the
rotor to break and the quadcopter to fall from the sky after a
short period of flight. In [6] the authors demonstrated that a
part’s tensile strength can be degraded by introducing defects
such as voids (internal cavities) into the 3D design files.
Currently, there is no efficient way to determine whether a
3D design will produce a well-functioning 3D object. Mechan-
ical engineers rely on computerized simulations to reduce the
chance of a faulty design. In [7] Rajarishi Sinha et al. presented
an overview of modeling and simulation technologies that are
used to validate 3D designs. In their paper, they discuss both
the tools for simulations and the limits of those methods.
To create the marketplace that is presented in this paper,
we rely on previous work in several fields. The fundamental
trust aspects of the marketplace are inspired by the common
e-commerce trust models [8]; we included the concept of
reputation in our marketplace. Our formulas were inspired
by the basic model of reputation for e-commerce which was
introduced by Xiong and Liu in [9].
The mathematical model is based on game theory models of
output agreement mechanisms that pay agents that agree with
their peers when performing tasks that require effort. In [10]
the authors present a model that elicits effort and truth telling
of the participating agents, but the model assumes prescreening
of agents. The work of Witkowski et al. [11] builds upon
the research done in [10] and relaxes the screening constraint
and proves that truthfulness and effort can be elicited through
determining the values of rewards and penalties.
The need for a distributed market for 3D designs for AM has
been addressed in industry white papers; for example, in [12]
the authors discuss potential uses for blockchain technology
for AM. The authors present a high level architecture of how
decentralized and distributed manufacturing platform should
be constructed. Thus far, the majority of work on blockchain
for AM has focused on copyrights preservation [13] and
securing the supply chain [14].
The blockchain implementation is built on top of Ethereum
[15] and consists of smart contracts. An example of creating
a marketplace on top of blockchain was presented by Chlu
in [16]. In the white paper, the authors present a platform
for e-commerce that enables online shops to integrate their
payments and reputation systems into the platform. Recently,
many research papers on integration of Blockcahin in IoT were
published. Christidis et al. reviewed Blockchain and smart
contract applications for IoT in /citechristidis2016blockchains
that also discusses the facilitation of the sharing of services and
resources between devices. In [17], the authors present a plat-
form for Industrial Internet of Things based on the Blockchain
technology. The platform enables peers in a trustless network
to interact with each other without the need for a trusted
intermediary.
III. THE THREAT MODEL AND MOTIVATION
Typically, the 3D printing process starts with the 3D design
file, which is the blueprint of the final 3D object. The format
of the design files is generally CAD that is transformed to
STL, AMF or 3MF file formats. Minor changes to the design
file in this phase can completely alter the printed result [5].
Before printing, the design has to be “sliced” into individual
layers and translated to 3D printed instructions that can be
sent to the 3D printer. Open source software, such as Slic3r
and Cura, is commonly used for desktop 3D printers that
employ FDM technology, and the resulting file, containing the
instruction set, is produced. The file describes the tool path
that is sent to the 3D printer via USB, SD card or network
connection. The tool path is commonly composed of G-Code
commands, a legacy language for CNC machines. A change
to the tool path file can have the same harmful effects as
a change to the original design files. However, a malicious
modification in this phase is harder to detect since there is no
easy way to reverse the G-code command back to the original
design. Regardless of the compromised representation, the
cyber-physical impact depends on the physical change made
to the printed object.
Predictions about the future of AM describe scenarios where
anyone can download design files, customize them, and man-
ufacture anything [18]. Currently, there are two categories
of AM users. The first category consists of home users or
hobbyists that manufacture 3D objects in a home environment,
mainly using fused filament fabrication (FDM) technologies.
Design files are either self-made or downloaded from publicly
available repositories. In this case, the harmful effect of a
malicious or flawed design is usually limited; it can result
in wasted time or materials, but only in extreme cases cause
harm. The second category consists of industrial users who
design and manufacture 3D objects and functioning parts for
industries, such as the automotive and aviation industry, or
for military use. The design files are created either in-house
or imported via a trusted supply chain. However, in both use
cases, the design files are the weakest link in the manufacturing
process. Thus, there is a need in adding a security layer for
the validation of 3D design files. However, validation of design
files is a complex task that requires expertise and cannot be
easily automated. To solve this problem, we suggest construct-
ing a marketplace that encourages the creation and sale of
such designs. Since AM technology is fragmented across many
sectors, and there is currently no entity that can ensure quality
testing across all of the different disciplines. Moreover, even if
such an entity existed, issues of trust with rival companies and
the threat of closed source logic for calculations of reputation
and rewards would remain a problem. Therefore, we cannot
rely on a centralized marketplace, there is a need for a
decentralized solution, where designs are decoupled from their
creators and tested by the community, and only then are sold.
In order to ensure transparency, we use Blockchain. It enables
transparency of both the vote history of the users and the code
that is used to calculate the results. All of the data needed
for calculation, especially payment calculations, is stored and
publicly verifiable. This guarantees that no censorship takes
place by a single entity and the results are not biased.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
A. Transaction Definition
We define a transaction process G to be the entire pro-
cess a 3D design undergoes in the trust model. Let G =<
d,EP, FP, τr, τp, q
∗ > where,
• d is the design file. The design file also contains the
printing instructions that specify how to translate the
design to the 3D printer instructions set;
• EP (evaluation players) and FP (feedback players) are
sets of players in the evaluation phase and feedback
phase, respectively. A player can participate either in the
evaluation phase or the feedback phase EP ∩ FP = ∅.
Since the rewards and penalties of EP are determined
based on the feedback of FP , thus these group have to
be distinct to promote truthfulness;
• τr and τp represent the evaluation phase reward and
penalty, respectively;
• the desired reputation level/quality level of the result is
denoted by q∗ > 12 .
We use T (i) to denote the set of transactions in which player
i has participated and D(j) to denote the set of players in
transaction j.
B. Transaction Output
The output of transaction process j is a tuple outputj =<
rj , FSf (j) > where,
• rj ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is the result that indicates whether the
design is valid (1 denotes a valid design, −1 denotes an
invalid design, and 0 indicates that the validation of the
design could not be determined);
• FSf ∈ [0, 1] indicates the normalized final score after
the feedback phase and can refer to the correctness of rj
(also referred to as ”weighted majority voting”).
Each player i in G has a reputation rep(i) ∈ [0, 1] which was
gathered from i’s participation in previous transactions in the
marketplace. In this paper, we use FS and D notations to
refer to general concepts that apply to both phases (evaluation
and feedback).
We distinguish between the final scores of each phase. We
use FSe (D(j) = EP ) and FSf (D(j) = FP ) to denote
the weighted majority voting of the evaluation phase and the
feedback phase respectively.
V. THE TRUST MODEL
In this section we describe the stages of the trust model.
The trust model starts with a 3D design file that is uploaded
for evaluation and ends with the 3D design file being sold in
the marketplace or taken down due to inadequate quality. In
this section we describe the process, providing a high level
overview and a description of each phase of the process.
A. High Level Process Flow
Similar to traditional e-commerce models, the purpose of the
marketplace is to sell goods; specifically, to sell 3D designs
to additive manufacturers. However, unlike traditional settings,
general feedback about the quality of the design is insufficient.
Validation of a 3D design can be done in various ways and
levels of reliability. The testing can be done by design experts
that validate the 3D design properties and best-practices, or it
can be done in a more practical method by printing out the
design and testing the 3D object. In this paper, we focus on
validation that involves comprehensive real world testing that
is both expensive and time consuming. The design needs to be
printed, as well as potentially integrated as a functioning part
in a different system or object, and the system or the object
need to be tested.
To incentivize users to perform such evaluation, we provide
financial rewards for participation in the evaluation phase. To
prevent abuse, financial penalties may be applied if users are
not truthful or disagree with others. Our two phase trust model
is presented in Figure 2.
Before a design is permanently sold in the marketplace, it
must go through the phases of the trust model. In the first
Figure 2: Diagram of the trust model
phase, the “evaluation phase,” the design is downloaded for
free and evaluated by the EP . If, as a result of the vote, the
design is determined to be valid, it is sold in the marketplace.
The second phase, the “feedback phase,” depends on gathering
feedback from the FP (who purchased the design), in order
to act as a “fail safe” against errors that may have occurred
in the first phase. If the design passes the quality threshold q∗
in both phases, it is sold in the marketplace. Otherwise, it is
taken down.
B. Reputation
1) Reputation Calculation: Each player i in the market-
place has a reputation rep(i) which is calculated based on the
final score FS(j) for every j ∈ T (i). To define reputation
in the proposed trust model, we adapt the basic model of
trustfulness discussed in [9] for calculation of reputation.
In their work, Xiong et al. construct a well known model
that computes trustfulness of peers by accounting basic trust
parameters like feedback from other peers, the total number
of transactions that the peer performs and credibility of the
feedback sources. In our model, the reputation value of each
player is calculated based on a comparison of the player’s
votes in previous transactions and the final scores of these
transactions, reflecting whether the player voted along with
the weighted majority. We define ai(j) as the answer (or vote)
of player i in transaction j ∈ T (i) in the following manner:
ai(j) =

1, if d is valid
−1, if d is invalid
0, no answer or can not decide
(1)
The vote can apply to the evaluation phase or the feedback
phase, depending in which phase player i participated in
transaction j. Then we define rep(i) as:
rep(i) =
1
2
· (
∑
j∈T (i) ai(j) · rj · FS(j)∑
j∈T (i) FS(j)
+ 1) (2)
The main component of equation 2 is terminated by the
answer ai(j) that the player i provided in transaction j multi-
plied by the final score of that transaction. Thus, transactions
with a higher final score will have greater impact on the
reputation of agent i. The value rj indicates the trajectory
of the scoring, rj = 1 means that the design is valid with the
collective vote of FS(j), and rj = −1 means that the design
is invalid with the collective score of FS(j). When combined
with the value ai(j), repi(j) increases (the reputation builds)
for each transaction j ∈ T (i) where sign(ai(j)) = sign(rj).
Thus, repi(j) increases only when the player agreed with the
weighted majority in transaction j. Otherwise, the reputation
decreases, meaning that the value of repi(j) decreases and
lowering the impact player i has on future transactions. The
value of FS(j) influences the amount the reputation increases
or decreases thus the level of future influence of player i.
Finally, we normalize the equation.
2) Weighted Majority Voting: The weighted majority voting
(or final score) is calculated in both phases of the trust
model in the same manner. The final score of transaction j is
calculated based on the answers ai for each player i ∈ D(j)
and their reputation rep(i). Higher reputation values have
greater impact on the final score of the transaction. However,
the reputation of a player cannot stand alone in this setting,
since the amount of transactions the player has should also be
a factor, e.g., player i1 with reputation R who participated in
|T (i1)| = 10 transactions should have less influence on the
final score than player i2 with reputation R that participated
in |T (i2)| = 100 transactions, specifically, 10 times less
influence. Therefore, we add a component of weight to the
reputation of each player.
wi(j) =
|T (i)|∑
k∈D(j) |T (k)|
(3)
We calculate the final score FS as follows:
FS(j) =
1
2
· (
∑
i∈D(j) ai(j) · rep(i) · wi(j)∑
i∈D(j) rep(i) · wi(j)
+ 1) (4)
The value of equation 4 is mainly determined by the scalar
product of ai(j) ∀i ∈ D(j) and the weighted reputations of the
players rep(i) · wi. Thus, the votes of players with a higher
weighted reputation have greater impact on the final score.
Since ai is a signed value and the main component of the
equation derives a value ∈ [−1, 1]; we normalize this value
for the final score.
The results of a weighted majority vote are as follows:
rj = 1, if FS(j) > q∗
rj = −1, if FS(j) < 1− q∗
rj = 0, otherwise
(5)
If the result of the weighted voting is larger than q∗, the
design is determined to be valid. If FS(j) < 1−q∗, the design
is determined to be invalid. Otherwise, the game is annulled,
and rj = 0.
C. Compensation Mechanisms
1) Rewards and Penalties: In the evaluation phase, the
design is uploaded to the marketplace and available for free
to any tester i ∈ EP . Every tester i must provide an answer
aei at the end of the evaluation phase, where a
e
i (j) = ai(j)
∀j ∈ EP . The reward or penalty for each player is determined
both by the weighted majority and, in retrospect, by the
voting in the feedback phase. Figure 3 presents the rewards
and penalties a player may receive during a transaction. In
the evaluation phase, since every participating player must
provide a rating, players who do not answer, choose to pass
after downloading the design, or do not reveal their vote as
discussed in section VI, will pay a penalty of τp. The payment
for other players, who have provided a valid/invalid rating,
is determined by the weighted majority of their peers. If the
weighted majority has agreed with them, they get a reward of
τr and a penalty of τp otherwise. We discuss how to assign
specific values to the rewards and penalties in section V-D.
2) Feedback: The reputation of a player who has voted with
the weighted majority will increase in both phases. Equation
2 describes the calculation of the reputation for each player.
For each vote that corresponds with the weighted majority
in transaction j, the reputation will increase by FS(j) and
Figure 3: Diagram of the rewards and penalties
be normalized. Thus, in the evaluation phase, players that
vote with the weighted majority receive a reward of τr, and
their reputation grows; players who voted against the weighted
majority receive a penalty of τp and their reputation decreases.
Since players already know that the design has been rated
high enough to be sold, there may be confirmation bias in the
feedback phase, such that FP players might agree with the
valid rating more easily. Thus, the model does not provide
financial compensation for the feedback players. However,
lack of motivation might result in biased feedback, and in order
to prevent that, the reputation of players who voted with the
weighted majority will increase. Similarly, the reputation of
players that voted against the weighted majority will decrease.
D. Truthfulness
We assume that the players in each transaction are rational,
selfish, and independent agents. The output agreement pre-
sented in this section describes the way in which a player
receives a reward for agreeing with his/her peers and a
penalty for disagreeing. The desired strategy that leads to
Nash Equilibrium in the proposed model is when the players
answer truthfully after investing effort in testing the 3D design.
Smartly choosing the values of the compensations will compel
the players to choose this strategy. We rely on the results of
Witkowski et al. that were presented in [11] which showed
that with the appropriate payments, agents prefer passing (not
participating) to guessing, and moreover that if they choose to
participate and invest effort, truthfulness is their best strategy.
We logically reduce their problem to the problem presented
in this paper and apply their findings to the proposed model
in order to determine the suitable compensation values that
will lead to the desired Nash Equilibrium. In the paper, the
authors describe a game in which there are two items A and
B that need ranking. Each selfish and independent agent has
to invest effort to observe which of the items is better. Agents
get a reward for agreeing with their peers and a penalty for
disagreeing. We rely on their results and adapt them to our
model in the following way.
In our model, without the loss of generality, let A be a
valid design and B be an invalid design. Let C∗ > 0 be the
cost of effort. We define C∗ as the cost of the material that is
needed to 3D print the design. Since the amount of material
can be derived from the design and metadata of the design,
it can be estimated and will be the same for all players that
follow the printing instructions. The authors discuss a self-
selecting mechanism for which every agent below a specific
qualification factor will choose not to participate. The qualifi-
cation factor indicates the probability of observing the correct
answer after investing effort. In our model, we defined this
minimal quality factor as q∗ ∈ [ 12 , 1]. We define x∗ to be the
normalized value of q∗, so that q∗ = x
∗+1
2 and x
∗ = 2 ·q∗−1.
In [11] the authors prove that a certain amounts of payments
induce truth-telling in the describes settings. We project their
model onto our model and define the payments in the same
way. Thus, the payment for truth-telling should be:
τr =
2C∗
(x∗)2 + x∗
τr =
C∗
2 · (q∗)2 (6)
and the penalty payment should be:
τp = − 2C
∗
(x∗)2 + x∗
− 
τp = − C
∗
2 · (q∗)2 −  (7)
for → 0.
Since our scoring method is more complex than the binary
answer that is discussed in [11], we explain how the payment
for a player is determined. In the original work, each agent’s
answer is compared with a random peer, and if their votes
match, the agent received a reward (or a penalty if their votes
do not match). In our model, for each player k in transaction j,
we compare two independent values. We compare the player’s
weighted vote:
sign(
ak(j) · rep(k) · wk(j)∑
i∈D(j) rep(i)
)
with the weighted vote of the rest of the players:
sign(
∑
i∈D(j)\k ai(j) · rep(i) · wi(j)∑
i∈D(j) rep(i)
)
if the signs match, meaning that the player voted along the
weighted majority, the player gets a reward τr; if otherwise
the player receives a penalty τp. For each player, we reduce
the complexity by assuming that the player’s vote is compared
to another peer with the weighted answer and the reputation
of the rest of the players.
VI. BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the blockchain implementation
and procedure sequence of the distributed attestation. A design
voting smart contract is constructed to execute the trust model
rules as a result of the messages (blockchain transactions) it
gets from the entities (accounts) in the system. Figure 4 shows
the sequence of the procedures and the interaction between
the parties involved: the evaluating players, the vendor, the
design voting smart contract, and a semi-trusted manager. The
process consists of three phases: the registration phase, distri-
bution and evaluation phase, and finally, the result calculation
phase.
In section VI-A we describe the parties involved in more depth,
and in section VI-B we provide a description of the protocol
and the different steps in a distributed attestation of a single
design.
A. Parties Involved
Vendor. A vendor, i.e. the designer of a 3D design is denoted
by v. The vendor’s interest in the framework is to obtain a
transparent and reliable evaluation of the proposed design,
so a large pool of potential buyers can be convinced of
the designs validity and be encouraged to download and
use it.
Players. A player, i.e., a single consumer from the set EP
(or FP when in feedback phase), is denoted by pi. A
third party identity provider, denoted by IP , is required
to sign the public address of pi in the blockchain to attest
that the player is linked to a unique authenticated real-
world identity.
Design Voting Smart Contract. The smart contract, denoted
by C, is responsible for the publicly verifiable calcula-
tion of the weighted majority voting for each design,
with respect to the formulas presented in section V.
The contract stores the players’ states: their reputation,
voting weight, and previous votes. Evaluation\feedback
messages are sent by the players to the contract, and
eventually, a design’s < rj , FS(j) > is calculated using
the participating player’s reputations and recent votes.
The pseudocode for the smart contract is presented in
Algorithms 1 and 2.
Manager. A semi-trusted entity, denoted by m, ensures a fair
exchange of a 3D design for an evaluation. Specifically,
the manager is trusted for ensuring that player pi is
marked as a receiver of the design file in the system
if and only if he/she indeed received the design. This
is needed for a trustworthy execution of the design
voting contract. Note that the manager is not trusted
to ensure the reliability of the evaluation messages of
the players. Also, the integrity of the messages that are
handled by the manager can be checked since a player
registration is verified against his/her public address and
a corresponding signature by an identity provider on that
same address. Additionally, the manager is not involved
in the calculation of the final score and the rewarding and
penalizing of the players, as these are done in a publicly
verifiable way by the smart contract.
To minimize the dependence in the manager further,
the manager may be implemented by a consortium of
authorities to distribute the trust, or by using a trusted
execution environment such as Intel SGX. These options
are out of the scope of this paper and left as a direction
for future work.
The public key of m is hard-coded into the smart contract
C, and all participating parties must create an reliable
Figure 4: Outline of the entire design evaluation process using a design voting contract
and authenticated channel using m. (i.e. authenticates
messages passed in it with respect to the public key of m
and the public key of the counter party as was published
in the smart contract, and every packet sender knows
whether it reached its destination).
B. Protocol Description
In this section we describe the sequence of procedures
performed as part of the distributed attestation protocol. The
flow consists of three main phases: the registration phase,
distribution and evaluation phase, and result calculation phase.
1) Registration Phase: First, some party deploys the
design voting smart contract C. The deploying party
should not necessarily be trusted, as the contract code is
meant to be published and can be independently audited
by anyone. Without loss of generality, we say that v
itself deploys the contract. The contract is meant to host
the logics for the voting and evaluation of all designs,
hence a setup step of registration needs to take place
only once.
Second, a vendor v announces a new available design
d by sending announce(Hd) to the smart contract,
where Hd is the design file identifier (a cryptographic
hash digest of the file). The pseudo code of the command
is detailed in algorithm 1. Also, this message should
contain a collateral from the vendor. This collateral
will be used to later reward the participating players
according to their voting.
As a consequence, the contract emits
newDesign(Hd, j, v) as an event, where j is the
index of the design d (transaction j). The vendor and
all potential players who listen to the event receive this
notification.
Next, the semi-trusted manager m is needed to conduct
the fair exchange of the design d for an evaluation.
Specifically:
- v sends d to m.
- m verifies that H(d) = Hd, where H is the
cryptographic hash function agreed upon in the protocol.
If the condition does not hold, m stops interaction with
v and does not continue distribution of this particular
design.
- Each interested player pi ∈ EF (or FP when in
feedback phase) registers to the contract by sending a
transaction to the function register (algorithm 1)
with:
a) a signature of the identity provider IP on his/her public
address, denoted by σIPi ;
b) collateral - a deposit of at least τp.
The contract will verify the signature of IP on the public
address of pi and store the deposited collateral amount
with an allocated initial empty state for pi.
- pi is registered and authenticated via a private channel
in front of the manager m (i.e., proving possession of the
private key associated with the public key he/she used for
the registration in the contract).
2) Distribution and Evaluation Phase: This phase is spit-
ted into three steps: (a) distribution step, (b) commit step,
and (c) reveal step.
Distribution step:
- m sends d to each pi ∈ EP (and each pi ∈ FP
when in feedback phase).
- pi also checks H(d) = Hd.
- m sends setReceived(pi, j) to the smart con-
tract. This call will set the respective flag reserved for
pi and design d (of index j) in the contract as true.
This flag indicates that pi’s vote should count. If pi
does not vote, the player should be penalized.
Commit step: The commit step in the contract is a
step where each player should send a cryptographic
commitment of his/her vote with respect to a specific
design announced.
∆commit is a preset contract constant, which indi-
cates the maximum time allowed between a vendor’s
announce message and a corresponding commit
message by a registered player. Hence, the commit
step for the design of index j starts separately for
every player pi from the moment when m has called
setReceived(pi, j) (algorithm 1), and ends collec-
tively upon the expiration of ∆commit, after which all
commit messages to that same design will be reverted
(e.g., throw an error).
We are using a commit-reveal scheme with a shared
commit phase end time per design, in order to prevent
players from biased voting in which a player votes
according to the votes of other players.
Therefore, in this step, pi sends commit(Cai(j),r, j)
(algorithm 1), where Cai(j),r is the cryptographic com-
mitment to ai(j), using the blinding factor r.
Reveal step: The reveal step in the contract is a
step in which each player should send the opening of
his/her cryptographic commitment sent in the preced-
ing commit message, and reveal the vote ai(j).
∆reveal is a preset contract constant, which indicates
the maximum time allowed between ∆commit and a
reveal message with respect to the same design.
Hence, the reveal step starts from the expiration of
∆commit and ends with the expiration of ∆reveal,
after which all sent reveal messages sent will be
reverted (e.g., throw an error). Thus, in this step pi
sends reveal(ai(j), r, j) (algorithm 1), where r is
the blinding factor used to create the commitment
Cai(j),r. The state of pi is now updated in the contract
with the player’s vote.
3) Result Calculation Phase: Any party can
initiate the result calculation phase by sending
calculateResult(j) (algorithm 2) to the smart
contract C. Since the outcome of the calculation phase
is independent of the sender, any party can initiate
the calculation. Again, for brevity and without loss of
generality, we say that a v performs this step (if the v is
motivated not to send this message because calculating
the result score may damage him/her, then any other
player or external party can do this). The smart contract,
given the state of all of the players’ current votes and
calculated reputations from previous designs, calculates
the design’s final score FS(j) and the respective result
rj as described in the equations mentioned in section V.
As a consequence, C emits resultCalculated(rj)
with the weighted majority voting result rj to all of the
parties involved, and accordingly, all of the penalties or
rewards can be collected or provided using the collateral
of the parties involved (both v’s and the players’
collateral). Penalties and rewards are also calculated in
terms of individual reputation. Moreover, penalties are
collected from players for which m reported that the
player received d, but did not provide an evaluation for
j, in order to prevent players from “free-riding” and just
getting the design for free, or alternatively, deciding not
to reveal their vote in the reveal phase if they find out
that they voted against the majority after viewing the
other votes in clear text.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we presented a model that is based on rational,
selfish, and independent agents. In real-world scenarios this
may not be the case. There might be coalitions between
agents that are working towards a common goal or “irrational”
decisions that might result in financial loss but achieve some
out of scope goal. In this section, we try to suggest possible
improvements to the model that can address those problems.
We also discuss outstanding questions which will be addressed
in future work.
Since the model relies on trust, there are many opportunities
for fraud. We try to address some of them here:
Copyrights - Since there is no correlation between the cost of
the design and the penalty for not voting in the evaluation
phase, if the design is costly, it might get stolen. A
possible way to address this, is to watermark the design
files so that if they are stolen, the player will be banned
from the marketplace and penalized. Since the identity is
derived from a third party entity, there might be a way
to penalize the identity of the player in additional ways.
Coalition - The mathematical model that is used in this
paper does not take into account possible collaboration
between players. In order to detect such coalitions, an
external mechanism can be constructed that aims at
detecting players that vote together and restricting their
Algorithm 1: Design Voting Smart Contract - part 1
Initialize playerStates := ∅
Initialize results := ∅
Initialize designStates := ∅
Initialize constants: ∆commit,∆reveal, q, τp, τr, ,m
on contract input announce (Hd, $X) from v at time
T :
j := |designStates|
designStates[j].vendor:= v
designStates[j].T:= T
designStates[j].balance:= $X
emit newDesign(Hd, j, v)
on contract input register (σIPi , j, $X) from pi:
discard if σIPi is an invalid signature of IP on pi
discard if $X < τp
discard if the number of registered players for design
j together with pi, exceeds
designStates[j].balance ÷ τr
playerStates[pi].reputation := 
playerStates[pi].weight := 
playerStates[pi].commitments := ∅
playerStates[pi].votes := ∅
playerStates[pi].received := ∅
on contract input setReceived (pi, j) from s:
discard if s 6= m
playerStates[pi].received[j] = TRUE
on contract input commit (Cai(j),r, j) from pi at time
T :
discard if playerStates[j].received 6= TRUE
discard if T > designStates[j].T +∆commit
playerStates[pi].commitments[j] := Cai(j),r
on contract input reveal (ai(j), r, j) from pi at time
T :
discard if T > designStates[j].T + ∆commit +
∆reveal
discard if H(ai(j), r) 6=
playerStates[pi].commitments[j]
playerStates[pi].votes[j]= ai(j)
Algorithm 2: Design Voting Smart Contract - part 2
on contract input calculateResult (j) at time T :
discard if T ≤ designStates[j].T + ∆commit +
∆reveal
set FS(j) as the calculation of the final score of
transaction j according to equation 4, using the
players’ reputation, weights and votes from
playerStates, and the results array.
set rj as the voting result using FS(j), q
for each player pi s.t. playerStates[pi].votes[j] 6=
NULL:
- send pi its deposit after increasing\reducing a
reward\penalty according to the penalties\rewards
formulas. - set playerStates[pi].weight and
playerStates[pi].reputation according to the
reputation and weight formulas.
send designStates[j].vendor its remaining deposit
emit resultCalculated(j, rj)
participation. In future work we plan to address this issue
and suggest such an external mechanism.
Elicitation of Effort - The trust model is built on the assump-
tion that we cannot prove effort was invested. In AM there
is a need to 3D print the design, possibly integrate it into
an external system and test the system. We cannot provide
a mathematical proof for the entire process, but future
improvements in 3D printers might provide mathematical
proofs for the 3D printing phase. If a player can provide
a proof-of-print (PoP), equation 4 can be tweaked to give
this player’s vote more weight. One suggestion for how
to implement this PoP is to add a trusted environment to
3D printers which would provide a mathematical proof
for the activity of the 3D printer. Even though any PoP
can be eventually hacked or forged, it can still act as
an additional layer of security. In future work we will
explore possible implementations for PoPs.
Gaining Reputation for a Single “Hit” - A player with
external motivation might invest time and money in
order to gain enough reputation to sway one or several
transactions. We believe that such a scenario cannot be
addressed with logic or financial penalties. A possible
way of reducing this risk is to rely on a strong third
party identity provider. Another way is restricting the
participation of players with a small number of previous
transactions or with a low amount of gained reputation.
There are multiple points that we plan to address in future
work:
1) We would like to extend the variety of players by allowing
to validate a design in additional ways. In addition to
physical testing, we can add validation by examining the
soundness of the 3D design itself, or by running computer
simulations on the design. Each player can choose the
method of validation and each method will have different
influence over the FS. Another parameter that we can
integrate into the equation is the level of confidence the
player has in his/her evaluation.
2) In our blockchain implementation we rely on the smart
contract keeping history of all the previous votes. Cur-
rently, this prompts non-trivial gas costs and in future
work we will explore alternative storage options.
3) We plan to extend this model to additional use cases.
This model excels in scenarios where there is a need in
eliciting effort from experts. Thus, the proposed model
can also be used to attest complex tasks like verification
of open-source code by a community. This problem is at
the heart of the trust in open-source software and a way
to enhance the security and the reliance on the open-
source code can have a great impact. Another use case is
a bug reporting system, where each bug is tested by the
community and voted upon.
In Conclusion, we believe that the proposed marketplace
is an interesting and novel idea, since it suggests a way
to attest a complex task with no known ground truth. The
mathematical trust model elicits effort and truth-telling by
utilizing a reward/penalty system. The payment for the players
is calculated based on their votes and reputation compared to
their peers’ votes and the proposed implementation is built
on blockchain which is decentralized and publicly verifiable
infrastructure.
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